

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.270
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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

(United Arab Republic)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. A. de COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. G. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. C. J. MARSHALL

Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE

Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

Mr. M. E. BRIMAH

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. Y. M. VORONTSOV
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV
Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. G. BREAM
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and seventieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling upon the first speaker on my list, I should like to add my voice to that of the other delegations that have welcomed the new leader of the Brazilian delegation, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): In examining the various collateral measures aimed at restricting the arms race and reducing international tension, the Bulgarian delegation has always been guided by considerations of the effective influence which any particular collateral measure might have on the solution, or the bringing closer of the solution, of the main problem of our Committee, general and complete disarmament. In our view the criterion of the usefulness or necessity of each of the collateral measures proposed in the Committee should be the degree to which the measure ensures the conditions for progress in our negotiations towards solving the problem of general and complete disarmament on the basis of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5).

Many proposals of such a nature have been put forward by the socialist and other countries in recent years, and we have had an opportunity to express our point of view on them. Our positions remain valid to this day. Therefore I do not intend to justify them again, especially as there has not been, unfortunately, any decisive progress on a single one of these proposals.

Of course, the attention of our delegation, as of most delegations in the Committee, is devoted primarily to measures which would lead to nuclear disarmament. We regard this as the most urgent problem, the solution of which would eliminate the greatest threat to peace and to human civilization. It would be best to destroy all nuclear weapons at once; but, as we see, they have proliferated and are proliferating still further, thanks to the advocates of "nuclear strategy". Therefore, if nuclear disarmament has to be approached by way of collateral measures, gradually, then it seems to us - without this way being regarded as the only one - that it would be easiest for us to attain that objective by developing still further the successes already achieved in that direction.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

I am referring to the Moscow Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the possibility of extending the scope of that treaty to cover underground tests as well. The necessary, logical steps after that would be the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of nuclear weapons themselves; that would create a situation which would enable States to reach agreement on the initiation and the form of the process of the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of their production, together with the elimination of all delivery vehicles and the prohibition of their manufacture. Such an approach would make it possible to come very close to solving the urgent question of implementing a programme of nuclear disarmament.

A different approach is suggested to us by the Western delegations. That approach, however, is far removed from the idea of the urgency of the problem of nuclear disarmament.

In the first place, it essentially leaves intact the nuclear potential of States possessing nuclear weapons, and also the possibility of its increase.

Secondly, it bypasses the key question of prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons themselves.

Thirdly, it does not affect the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

The question arises why the Western States, which always maintain that they advocate the elimination of nuclear weapons, do not agree to take the most elementary step, a step approved by the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world: to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and support the proposal to ban such weapons. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and their prohibition would lay the foundation upon which it would be possible to begin to adopt and implement an agreed programme of nuclear disarmament under strict international control. That would be a far better and more useful "demonstration" than what is sometimes suggested to us in the Committee. Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons is a condition without which it is difficult to conceive of any serious, realistic steps towards nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Apparently, behind the facade of the collateral proposals, which have an extremely remote relation to an effective solution of this problem and which are being put forward here in the Committee, there lie other plans, other intentions, directly opposed to the aims of the Committee. One is led to such a conclusion by, for example, the words of the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, who stated at the meeting of the Committee held on 4 April: "Nuclear weapons are the crucial element of our strategic deterrent forces." (ENDC/PV.254, p.18)

Mr. Foster added to that statement on 26 April when he said:

"Apocalyptic concepts of a world freed at a stroke from all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles may have a certain visionary appeal, but they are wholly impractical at this moment in time." (ENDC/PV.259, p.14)

Starting from such a concept, the Western delegations will naturally regard as "practical" only those collateral measures which do not affect nuclear weapons; and that is what in fact they are doing.

However, in this case it is not even necessary to demonstrate on whose side the truth lies; in this regard there is a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which condemns nuclear weapons as contrary to the Charter (A/RES/1652 (XVI)). That is what gives us, the representatives of a small peace-loving people, the courage to call again upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee to begin in earnest the examination and drafting of proposals, in the first place, in regard to those collateral measures which could effectively reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

Apart from the collateral measures relating to nuclear disarmament which I have mentioned today, I shall deal with two others. The first of these concerns the proposals to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. Our delegation supports the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-free zones. More detailed discussions of this problem in the Committee would lead to the elucidation of many aspects of these zones and their role in ensuring the peaceful development of their respective areas. This would be of particular importance for the areas where large stockpiles of nuclear weapons have already been accumulated and which are now being intensively turned into a spring-board for a future nuclear war.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Without doubt, one of the most dangerous hotbeds is Central Europe. The building up of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in this highly-developed industrial part of the world is fraught with dangerous consequences. Such a development cannot fail to arouse the anxiety of the European countries which are endeavouring to ensure the security of their continent. Nor can non-European States be indifferent to such a development, since events in Central Europe would inevitably affect the situation in the entire world.

It was as a result of the concern of some States that specific proposals were submitted in the Committee by the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/i; PV.189, p.6) and the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/151, 168), as were also the proposals of the Scandinavian and Balkan countries. Those proposals contain important measures for averting a dangerous development in the European area, and it seems to us that the Committee cannot ignore them. Their examination would contribute to the relaxation of tension in Europe, and not only in Europe but throughout the world.

A second measure in the same field on which I wish to dwell briefly is the question of extending the scope of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover all tests of nuclear weapons. It appears that in this connexion considerable documentary material has been accumulated and would facilitate an early solution. If we sum up the results of such a prolonged examination of the question of prohibiting underground nuclear tests, much that is positive can be found.

First of all, everyone maintains that these tests must be prohibited, and there is not a single State member of this Committee that would question the need for this. There is agreement that all aspects of these tests are dangerous: they stimulate the armaments race; they are used for the continual improvement of new types of nuclear weapons, thus greatly increasing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. They also ensure the conditions for the establishment of nuclear arsenals in other States that so far do not possess nuclear weapons of their own.

In the preamble and in article I of the Moscow Treaty there is direct reference to the necessity of prohibiting all experimental nuclear explosions. There is a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, 2032 (XX), which requests the Committee to "continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty" (ENDC/161).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

There are also a number of specific proposals by non-aligned countries, and it appears to be the view of most delegations that those proposals open up some prospect of a generally-acceptable agreement. Particularly interesting to us were the proposals of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259), Sweden (ENDC/154; PV.247) and some other States, concerning which we shall express our opinion when they have been submitted in their final form. But one can say even now that these proposals themselves show clearly that a political solution is required and that national means of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions are fully adequate to guarantee the observance of a future treaty. As is well known, the opinions of eminent scientists and experts throughout the world to the effect that technical means of seismic identification have reached a very high level of perfection also lead to this conclusion. Lastly, one of the great nuclear States, the Soviet Union, has stated repeatedly that it is prepared to sign an agreement — even of a compromise nature — banning all tests of nuclear weapons, on the lines of the Moscow Treaty.

All the aforesaid favourable conditions, which would facilitate the early conclusion of a treaty, are counterbalanced by one single obstacle: the stubborn insistence of the United States delegation on compulsory on-site inspection. Much has been said and proved, both inside and outside the Committee, about the lack of any need for such inspection, which would not provide any greater assurance but merely complicates the matter artificially.

Therefore, in order to achieve success in regard to banning all tests of nuclear weapons, it is necessary for the United States delegation to change its position and conform to the opinion of the vast majority of countries. Unfortunately the latest press reports again confirm that the United States Government continues to give preference to its programme for further improvement of nuclear weapons; in other words, that the United States continues to place its arms race policy above all else.

As for our delegation, we declare once again that we support the proposal to extend the scope of the Moscow Treaty to cover all tests of nuclear weapons, and we urge all the delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to insist on an early solution of this question on the same basis.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Collateral measures, by their direction and content, must help towards clearing the international situation of all elements of military blackmail and interference in the internal affairs of other States, and towards normalizing relations between States, thus facilitating the reaching of agreement on the complex questions of disarmament.

Among the most important problems in the field of collateral measures is the question of the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The importance of this measure has been stressed more than once in the Committee. The States disposing of such bases for military intervention against peoples striving for complete independence and free development can in no way justify their actions. The far-fetched pretexts of "preserving the balance" and combating "subversive activities" merely serve as a cover for the real purpose of military bases, which is to increase tension and to secure and facilitate the further domination of the imperialist States over freedom-loving peoples.

The United States war of aggression in Viet-Nam is a clear illustration of this. The establishment of United States military bases and the massing of United States troops and military equipment in Viet-Nam over a period of twelve years has led in the end to the present war and to confusion throughout South-East Asia. The United States war in Viet-Nam arouses the indignation of all unprejudiced people throughout the world, including the United States itself, and stirs them to protest against the utter extremes of brutality with which the leaders in Washington are waging that war. Many governments and peoples in all parts of the world will show increasing readiness to give moral and material support to Viet-Nam. Unless, therefore, the United States puts an end to its crimes in Viet-Nam, serious international complications may follow.

This bandit war of the United States in Viet-Nam started precisely with the transformation of South Viet-Nam into a military base against the liberation movements of the former colonies in Indo-China. Thus the elimination of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of all foreign troops to within their own national boundaries would be a measure, even though a collateral one and not direct disarmament, which would make the danger of war more remote and would improve the international situation. The peoples of the world will achieve

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the elimination of foreign military bases, perhaps even at great cost; but it would be to the honour of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee if it were to propose to the nations such a collateral measure, which is at the same time so decisive for peace.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As this is the first occasion upon which the Canadian delegation has spoken since Mr. Azeredo da Silveira has joined us, I should like to add our voice to those of other delegations which have welcomed him to the Committee. We know that Brazil has made very valuable contributions to the Committee's work in the past, and we are confident that it will continue to do so under the able leadership of Mr. Azeredo da Silveira.

Today, although I think it was agreed that the subject matter should be, generally, other collateral measures, I propose to speak mainly on the subject of non-proliferation, in accordance with the usual permissive arrangement which we have in the Committee. The reason I do so is that at the last two meetings rather important statements have been made by some of the Warsaw Pact countries, which I think should be replied to as soon as possible rather than waiting for the wheel to turn around again after several weeks to the subject of non-proliferation.

I suppose that all of us hoped that during the recent recess there could have been some changes of views or adjustments in positions which would lead to a significant break-through in our work. However, if we are to be realistic, we must now admit that it is clear from the statements which we have heard in the past weeks that no such development has occurred. Perhaps a break-through was too much to expect in view of the serious and complex issues which have to be resolved.

If we are not to sit here for the rest of the summer exchanging accusations and recriminations, we must try with goodwill to find what specific, if modest, results we can achieve with the material and time available to us.

There does seem to be agreement that we should try to avoid a situation where, as the representative of the Soviet Union put it at our meeting of 14 June, we have to "go empty-handed to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly" (ENDC/PV.264, p.23).

The problem is: on what question can we produce something tangible to show for our year's work? I hope we can also agree that, while we should all have liked to have a whole pie in the form of either an agreed

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non-proliferation treaty or an agreed comprehensive test-ban treaty to take to the General Assembly, half a pie is better than nothing. To continue the metaphor, the twenty-first session of the General Assembly will no doubt be disappointed if we do not produce whole pies, but certainly, if we go there and say that we have been in the kitchen for a whole year and have not even started to put the ingredients for our pies together, it rightly could condemn us as very slothful cooks.

As Mr. Roshchin observed at the close of our last session (ENDC/PV.263, p.29), we have in fact done useful work here in terms of exchanging ideas, clarifying positions and exploring differences. Our task should now be to convert those exchanges into tangible results, setting down on paper the various issues on which we have been able to agree and indicating those where we are still in disagreement. With something concrete like that to show the world, we could demonstrate that the disarmament dialogue we all believe in is of some value and worthy of continued support. However, if we fail to produce anything at all, we could place the continuance of disarmament negotiations in jeopardy.

Like most other delegations, the Canadian delegation still considers that the non-proliferation question should continue to have priority in our work. My suggestions, therefore, will refer to making progress on that problem. However, the techniques I have in mind could perhaps also be applied to other issues before us, such as the comprehensive test ban.

What we propose is that the Committee should now agree to dispense with further repetitious arguments on aspects of the non-proliferation problem which divide us and instead concentrate its attention on developing specific treaty language on those points on which it can agree. I know that if we attempt to frame an actual treaty this summer there will be parts of it which we shall probably have to leave blank. I also know that there is a significant number of aspects on which we could produce agreed language if we set our minds to the task.

The representative of Czechoslovakia reminded the Committee in his statement at the meeting on 16 June (ENDC/PV.265, p.13) that the Soviet Union delegation has already proposed that we undertake an article-by-article examination of the two texts before us. My delegation believes that the logical extension of such a process is to identify the aspects we can jointly accept and convert them into agreed language. If we were to apply ourselves conscientiously to that task in the time remaining at our disposal, I think we might be pleasantly surprised to find how much we could achieve. Certainly the refusal of any delegation here to participate in such an obvious and logical course of action will be difficult indeed to explain when this autumn at the General Assembly we are all called to account for our activities -- or perhaps inactivities.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In order to convert these suggestions into a practical programme of work, such as the representative of Italy called for in his statement on 16 June (ibid., p.20), I propose at the end of this statement to make two specific suggestions. However, before we can really hope to accomplish anything, we must once and for all dispose of an unacceptable argument advanced by some Eastern delegations.

I am referring, of course, to the suggestion that the Soviet Union Government has produced a draft non-dissemination treaty (ENDC/164) of such perfection that the Western delegations have been unable to find any fault in it. With all due respect, I should like to submit that the Soviet Union text is far from perfect, and, contrary to what the representative of Bulgaria said in his statement at our meeting on 21 June (ENDC/PV.266, p.7), Western countries represented in this Committee have pointed out a number of specific shortcomings. I shall leave it to other delegations to speak for themselves on that point; but I should like to remind Mr. Lukanov that in my statement at our meeting on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, pp. 12 et seq.) I listed a series of weaknesses and deficiencies in the current Soviet text. It is not necessary for me to take the Committee's time now to repeat the points I made on 4 April, as they are there in the verbatim record for anyone to see. It is perhaps sufficient to repeat once again, to anyone who may be in doubt, that the Soviet Union text in its present form is unacceptable to my delegation because it is unclear and imprecise in many aspects, contain certain unacceptable concepts, and fails in several respects to meet the criteria established by resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161).

To pursue that last point for a moment. Eastern delegations have been claiming that the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1) does not meet the requirements of resolution 2028 (XX). That is a contention which can be debated, especially in view of the imprecise language contained in the resolution; and I shall have something more to say about that in reference to the remarks of the representative of Poland at our meeting on 28 June (ENDC/PV.268). However, since Western delegations have never claimed absolute perfection for the United States text, it is perhaps irrelevant to argue on that point.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We should like to point out that the current Soviet draft clearly fails to fulfil several of the requirements set out at the twentieth session of the General Assembly. A case in point is to be found in paragraph 2 (d) of resolution 2028 (XX), which proposes: "There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty". The Soviet text ignores that point and particularly the important question of safeguards, which of necessity must form the basis of any arrangement to ensure the effectiveness of the proposed non-proliferation treaty.

In that connexion I think it was useful for the representative of Czechoslovakia to remind us in his statement on 16 June: "The Soviet delegation ... also showed its willingness to consider the question of guarantees in respect of the peaceful use of nuclear energy" (ENDC/PV.265, p.14). If that really is so, it would seem to my delegation that, in the process of attempting to evolve agreed language for various aspects of a common text during the next two months, we could usefully address ourselves to the question of safeguards to ensure peaceful use.

So we see that the attitude of representatives of Eastern European delegations to the Soviet draft treaty has been carefully hedged. They have been assiduously extolling its perfections but they have also created the impression that the Soviet delegation is prepared to accept amendments. In his statement at the meeting on 16 June the representative of Czechoslovakia went so far as to suggest that "the Soviet delegation submitted some substantial amendments to this draft in connexion with ensuring the security of non-nuclear States" (ibid.). As far as I am aware, the Soviet delegation has produced no formal amendments to its draft dealing either with the security of non-nuclear States or with any other subject. I will say, however, that I noted and was interested in Mr. Roshchin's remarks on this aspect of the problem at our meeting of 23 June (ENDC/PV.267, p.12). From a reading of the verbatim record it seemed that he was proposing tentative language for a new article intended to give certain assurances to States not possessing nuclear weapons. Although my delegation does not necessarily accept that idea as formulated by the Soviet delegation, we are happy to see that that delegation recognizes that its current draft is, in principle at least, not immutable and might be amended. In other words, it does not claim for it the same authority as the Ten Commandments handed down from Mount Sinai.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I should now like to make some comments on the statement made by the representative of Poland at our 268th meeting. As usual, he produced a thought-provoking series of arguments. With some of them we do not agree, but it is always a stimulating intellectual exercise to answer his ingenious contentions. One of his arguments is that the revised article I of the United States draft treaty is not consistent with operative paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. That paragraph reads as follows:

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form" (ENDC/161).

Unfortunately, contrary to what some delegations have asserted, that paragraph does not -- I repeat, not -- provide a clear direction on how the desired treaty to prevent proliferation should be drawn up. The reason why it is not clear is that the resolution does not define what meaning is to be attached to the word "proliferate". Again, there is the vague and metaphorical phrase "void of any loop-holes"; but the symbolic "loop-holes" are those through which proliferation might wriggle, so the meaning of the paragraph must be analysed in respect of the meaning attached to "proliferation". It has become very obvious, from our debates since we reassembled, that different delegations have different views on what is meant by that word and consequently by the compound word "non-proliferation".

For example, it has been argued in the Committee by the representative of a non-nuclear weapon nation that proliferation occurs if nuclear-weapon States add to their stocks of nuclear weapons; and that a treaty on non-proliferation should put a stop to that. It is hardly necessary to remind representatives that none of the nuclear-weapon Powers have accepted that interpretation of what is meant by "proliferation".

The provisions of the United States draft treaty are based on the premise that "proliferation" means an increase in the number of States or associations of States having "control" over nuclear weapons. The key expression occurs in the revised article I of the United States draft treaty, part of which reads as follows:

"Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes:

"1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States" (ENDC/152/Add.1).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The treaty includes a definition of "control" which sets out the precise meaning attached to the word in the aforementioned paragraph and in the treaty generally. The representative of Poland has stated his objections to that definition and the results which he considers might flow from it. I take his remarks from the French text, because it appears to me that the English interpretation of some of the words does not convey precisely the same meaning. Mr. Blusztajn said that the definition --

"... accorde aux pays non nucleaires tous droits de posséder et de disposer d'armes atomiques, exception faite pour le droit d'utilisation de ces armes, ce dernier exigeant l'accord préalable de la puissance atomique respective"
(ENDC/PV.268, p.6).

But does not the exception annul the idea of "all rights to possess and dispose of" nuclear weapons? Who would consider that he had all rights of possession and disposition of a motor-car, for example, if he had to obtain explicit permission from the party who furnished it to him each and every time he drove it? At the same meeting as that at which the representative of Poland made his statement, Mr. Foster gave a very full explanation (*ibid.*, pp. 14,15) of how the United States maintains control and intends to maintain control over any nuclear weapons which might, for purposes of essential defence or deterrence, be delivered by vehicles in the possession of or shared with allies. After that explanation, does the representative of Poland still believe that any non-nuclear ally of the United States would have unrestricted freedom of possession and disposition of nuclear weapons?

The representative of Poland said later in his statement: "We do not favour in the least the establishment of a special and exceptional status for non-nuclear countries members of military alliances" (*ibid.*, p.9). If Mr. Blusztajn meant that such countries should not have any special privilege to acquire control of nuclear weapons, we agree with him. But, as I have pointed out before, the non-nuclear-weapon States allied to a nuclear Power do, in very fact, have a different status from that of non-nuclear-weapon States which are not so aligned. The first group obviously are allies, and the second are not. The first group are by terms of their alliance bound to be at war if any member of their alliance is attacked. Referring to the NATO alliance, the troops of the non-nuclear allies would be facing attacks by troops of the other side having tactical nuclear weapons, and hence they would be at an intolerable disadvantage, unless some arrangements

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were made, as they have been made in certain cases within the NATO framework, under the restrictions which Mr. Foster has described, to equalize armaments. But these particular conditions and arrangements do not apply, as far as I know, elsewhere than in Europe and, to a limited extent, in the defence of North America.

The Canadian delegation does not suggest by this argument that the existing "confrontation" of troops armed with tactical nuclear weapons in Europe should go on indefinitely. But if the situation is to be changed it will be through a measure of disarmament, and suggestions about how it may be accomplished have been advanced, as we all know. However, it would not be appropriate to try to eliminate the existing arrangements through a non-proliferation treaty.

Finally, we note that the representative of Poland said on 28 June: "the conception of 'nuclear snaring' has not yet gone beyond the boundaries of purely theoretical reflections" (ibid., p. 8). Therefore we take it that, in the opinion of the representative of Poland, the existing state of affairs in NATO as regards bilateral arrangements and consultation does not amount to "nuclear sharing" and therefore is not something which the prospective treaty should attempt to rule out.

In passing, I deplore the introduction of the term "nuclear sharing" into the already so esoteric vocabulary of disarmament jargon. What does it mean? The sort of arrangements under consideration within the NATO alliance could be qualified correctly only by a fuller phrase, such as "the sharing of responsibilities within the alliance for the policy and strategy governing the use of nuclear weapons". To press a trigger of a nuclear weapon vehicle when given permission to do so by a nuclear Power does not constitute "nuclear sharing"; nor is it necessary to have possession of nuclear weapons in order to share in the responsibilities for their use.

The Canadian delegation has carefully studied the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 30 June, and we should like to comment on some of his remarks. He said:

"We are conducting our negotiations here on the basis of specific texts ... We must examine these texts article by article, provision by provision, including individual definitions." (ENDC/PV.269, p. 30).

We were glad to hear Mr. Roshchin say that, because that is our view of how we should carry out our work on non-proliferation from now on. What we are proposing today is

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that we carry that process to its logical conclusion and convert our examination of the two texts into specific treaty language in cases where agreement on specific issues can be established.

Mr. Roshchin also put a question to the United States representative as follows: "We should like to ask him in which provisions of our draft treaty he sees these new difficulties ... We want to know specifically", (ibid.)

He also asked:

"... Which of the provisions in our draft does not suit the United States delegation? Which of the articles of that draft would it like to change or supplement, and in what way, in view of the question of consultation raised by Mr. Foster?" (ibid., p.32)

Although those questions were addressed to the representative of the United States, perhaps I may be permitted to give a Canadian answer to them.

I have previously pointed out, on 5 May (ENDC/PV.262, p.18), that article II of the Soviet text would place parties to the treaty not possessing nuclear weapons under the obligation not to "participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in testing them" (ENDC/164, p.5). We take it that by those words -- prohibiting participation in control -- the Soviet Union contends that no non-nuclear-weapon member of an alliance shall have the right to a voice in determining how nuclear weapons may be employed in the defence of its territory, or how the totality of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the various members of the alliance shall be used in the deterrence of nuclear war. I said at the meeting to which I have just referred:

"To endeavour to write into a treaty conditions prohibiting consultation, joint debate on and determination of nuclear weapons policy is to attempt to negate the essence of an alliance. Furthermore, such provisions, even if they were drafted and a treaty were signed which contained such provisions, could not be controlled in the sense of being verified". (ENDC/PV.262, p. 19)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That, in brief, is one objection which the Canadian delegation has to the wording of article II of the Soviet draft treaty.

The representative of the USSR also asked the following question:

"Does the United States delegation consider that consultations, for example, on questions regarding the production of nuclear weapons can be allowed within the framework of a non-proliferation treaty?" (ENDC/PV.269, p.32).

The Canadian delegation cannot see that anything in the United States draft treaty would permit consultations over manufacture of nuclear weapons; in fact, these would be specifically prohibited by the second, third and fourth sub-paragraphs of article I and the corresponding paragraphs of article II. I pointed out on 4 April (ENDC/PV.254, p.10) that in fact provisions in the respective United States and Soviet Union draft treaties which purport to create obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and on nuclear-weapon States not to give any assistance to such manufacture, are for all practical purposes identical; and this, I think, answers that particular question of the representative of the Soviet Union.

I should like to summarize my delegation's thinking on the non-proliferation treaty negotiations in the following way. We have spent a significant part of our time since the beginning of this year debating and discussing various aspects of this problem; and we now have only about two months left before our adjournment for the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. Therefore the time has come to stop the general discussion and get down to the practical task of setting out our thoughts in concrete form. On some aspects we shall undoubtedly find ourselves unable to agree at this time, but on a number of others agreement should be possible.

In my delegation's view, the only question on which we still seriously disagree is the language which should be used to constitute a prohibition on the acquisition -- I repeat, acquisition -- of nuclear weapons from a nuclear Power by nations which do not now possess them. This disagreement, the Canadian delegation hopes, will be resolved before too long, but its solution must await decisions to be taken outside this Committee.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

So, while we may not be able to produce a complete treaty, there is no reason why we should not produce an agreed framework into which many details have been integrated. In doing so, we shall have been able to achieve some progress. With results such as that to demonstrate, we could reasonably seek a mandate to continue our efforts to resolve the remaining problems. The alternative is the "empty-handedness" of which Mr. Roshchin is rightly apprehensive and which will draw justifiable criticism from those who are watching our performance here.

The Canadian delegation believes that the course of action which we should follow is clear. To be as practical about the matter as possible, we should like, as I mentioned earlier, to make two specific proposals. In the first place, we are submitting a working paper for the attention of other delegations, and we request that it be circulated as a Conference document^{1/}. The document consists of three columns. In the left-hand column are contained the various articles of the United States draft treaty, while in the right-hand column at the appropriate place is the equivalent section of the Soviet draft treaty. Between those two texts we have left a blank column into which, it is hoped, we might begin to transcribe language to which we can all agree.

As you will see, the approach adopted is not a new one. The Canadian delegation has submitted such comparative working papers on other subjects in the past, most recently at our 254th meeting, on 4 April, when we circulated a paper comparing the draft articles II of the United States and USSR texts. The representative of Italy has recently given us some cogent arguments in favour of the action we are now taking, for example on 16 June (ENDC/PV.265, pp.22 et seq.).

The other proposal we should like to make is that for the remainder of this session the Committee devote regular or informal meetings once a week, or at least once every two weeks, to the process of constructing an agreed draft non-proliferation treaty. Since this is a question of procedure, I imagine that in the first instance it should be referred to our co-Chairmen for their comments. I hope they will agree to take up this matter as quickly as possible and let us have their views. When dealing with the problem they might also wish to consider an alternative arrangement: that the co-Chairmen themselves agree to hold regular meetings devoted to working

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/175

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

out mutually-acceptable language for those aspects of the non-proliferation problem on which there is substantial agreement. If they adopt such a course, we naturally hope they will keep the Committee informed of progress.

We suggest that it is only by attacking the problem by concrete action that we can achieve concrete results, and that the sooner we commence this task the better.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I do not wish to revert to the assessments that have been made concerning the prospects for our negotiations. One thing is beyond dispute; namely that the negotiations of this Committee are not taking place in a vacuum; they have been, are, and will continue to be inevitably influenced by what goes on in the world beyond the walls of this room. That is why it is impossible for us to consider our work and to think of the prospects of the discussions without stressing most earnestly and with a full sense of responsibility the negative influence on our Committee of the continuation and escalation of the war which the United States is waging in Viet-Nam.

In this connexion the Romanian delegation has made its point of view quite clear on several occasions. However, in view of the gravity of the situation, I should like to read out the statement made by Mr. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania, before the National Assembly on 30 June last, as follows:

"The attacks by United States aircraft on the suburbs of Hanoi, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and on Haifong, the most populated centres of North Viet-Nam, which have resulted in a number of victims and caused material damage, constitute a new phase of the war in Viet-Nam, the accentuation of the policy of flagrant violation of the most elementary rules of international law, representing at the same time a grave threat to world peace.

"Not being able to overcome the courageous struggle of the Viet-Nameese people, the United States of America has deliberately resorted to these new acts of war, which put the declarations of the supposed peaceful intentions of the United States leaders in their true light, at the same time showing what faith can be placed in those declarations.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

"The extension of the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has aroused the legitimate anger of the Romanian people and of public opinion throughout the world. It exposes its initiators to ever greater isolation and to general reprobation and condemnation. We believe that the forces which cherish the cause of peace will act resolutely in order to bring about the cessation of the aggression of the United States of America in Viet-Nam.

"The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, voicing the feelings of the Romanian people, firmly condemns the new aggressive actions against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, while drawing the attention of the United States of America to the heavy burden of responsibility which it is taking on by continuing and intensifying this war.

"Fully supporting the positions of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania demands the immediate and unconditional cessation of the bombing raids against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the ending of the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. All United States military forces and other foreign interventionist troops must be withdrawn from South Viet-Nam; the sacred right of the Viet-Nameese people to decide their own future themselves, without any foreign interference, must be respected; and the Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam must be applied.

"On behalf of the Romanian people and of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania", declared the Prime Minister, "I wish to address to the Viet-Nameese people, from this platform, our warm message of fraternal solidarity, and to express our admiration for the courage and valour with which they are resisting the aggressors. We are determined to continue giving the Viet-Nameese people our full support, material, moral and political, in their heroic struggle for the defence of their independence and national sovereignty and the integrity of their fatherland. We express our unshakeable confidence in the triumph of the just cause of the Viet-Nameese people, of the cause of peace and of the freedom of peoples."

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

It cannot be denied that, as long as the United States aggression in Viet-Nam continues, it is difficult to conceive that real progress can be made in accomplishing the tasks which have been assigned to us. We are convinced that, whether or not it is mentioned in the report to the General Assembly, the influence exercised on our work by the aggression of the United States of America in Viet-Nam is a fact.

I should now like to state the point of view of the Romanian delegation on the subject of certain collateral measures on the agenda of our meeting. In this connexion I think that we can rightly ask ourselves whether sufficient emphasis has been placed on the essential problems of the activity of our Committee, and whether we ought not to concentrate our efforts more than we have done so far on the key problem of all disarmament problems, nuclear disarmament.

To those who study the reports of our meetings it cannot fail to be regarded as symptomatic that in the statements of certain Western representatives, although the nuclear danger is recognized, there appears at the same time as an accepted fact the existence, even in ten or twenty years' time, of nuclear weapons, of stocks of such weapons of the nuclear Powers. That is a concept which cannot be accepted in view of the consequences entailed in the maintenance, indeed in the increase and improvement, of stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The priority of nuclear disarmament, of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the elimination of all existing stockpiles of such weapons, the prohibition of the production, stockpiling and retention of nuclear weapons and in general of all weapons of mass destruction, remains the decisive link in the chain of disarmament measures.

Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons does not, of course, afford full security against the nuclear danger. But it is none the less true that the complete and final elimination of the nuclear danger implies the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a prohibition which is a corollary of the liberation of mankind from the spectre of a nuclear war. If in the past it has been possible to prohibit weapons of mass destruction without also destroying the stockpiles of such weapons or preventing their production -- I have in mind the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, prohibiting the use of poisonous, chemical and bacteriological weapons -- for all the more reason it should be possible today to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons,

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

which by their very nature aim not only at disabling the combatants but at destroying whole countries and regions, and which therefore cannot be regarded as lawful weapons.

Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would therefore give formal expression to the juridical conscience of the peoples who hold that the use of these weapons would constitute a crime against humanity, as is stated so forcefully by resolution 1653 (XVI) of the United Nations General Assembly. This is why the Romanian delegation wishes to declare itself once again in favour of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and of the urgent convening of an international conference with a view to signing a convention to that effect.

Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of all weapons of mass destruction in general would improve, and very much so of course, the international political climate. The adoption of an international instrument comprising such a prohibition, which, moreover, would only express in up-to-date terms what has already been achieved through conventions in force, should be facilitated by practical experience, which shows that the accumulation of nuclear weapons is a manifest factor of permanent threat to the security of all States, including the great nuclear Powers.

It has been said that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would not in itself constitute a guarantee that they were not used. I will ask in my turn: if the use of nuclear weapons is not prohibited, will that give us an assurance that they will not be used, even supposing that they will continue to exist solely in the armouries of the present nuclear Powers? Has the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical, poisonous and bacteriological weapons been useless? In all logic, if one wishes that such weapons should not be used, one must begin by prohibiting their use.

I should also like to stress certain other aspects relating to the possibility and the usefulness of collateral disarmament measures: namely the liquidation of military blocs, the elimination of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of all armed forces stationed on foreign territory to within their own national borders, and the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

No one is unaware that the division of the world into hostile military blocs is a factor of tension in international relations, which fosters suspicion among States, an obstacle to co-operation among the peoples, and at the same time a permanent stimulus to the arms race. This is the reason why ever-wider sectors of public opinion and a growing number of States have recently been looking more and more each day towards a security based on other foundations than military blocs. As far as we are concerned, we think that it is only by abolishing military blocs that we shall succeed in bringing about real security in Europe -- an integral part, of course, of the security of all the peoples of the world.

In this connexion I should like to state once more the position of the Socialist Republic of Romania on this question, which is as important as it is topical.

We are in favour of the abolition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and also, consequently, of the Warsaw Pact, being of the opinion that military blocs have become a real anachronism in the political life of today. The problem of European security is by no means an abstract one for our people; it is closely connected with the conditions of their peaceful work. The Romanian Government is deeply concerned with the question of European security. Romania sponsored in the United Nations the well-known proposals concerning the development of good-neighbour relations among the countries of Europe belonging to different social systems.

As Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, recently stated:

"We are of the opinion that we must strive perseveringly to ensure new relations among the States of Europe, whatever their social system may be; relations based upon recognition of the right of every people to decide its own future and to choose the social system which it desires; relations founded upon respect for sovereignty and independence, on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of full equality of rights of all the nations of Europe. It is only on this basis that the conditions for real European security can be created.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

"It is evident that it is in this context that the German question must also be solved. It is necessary to bring about the conditions to ensure that the unification of Germany would be the result of an understanding between the two German States, between the Germans themselves. It is necessary, of course, to start out from present realities, the existence of two German States, and it is necessary to work with them for the security of Europe.

"We are concerned, like other peoples of Europe, that the German question should be solved in a democratic and peaceful manner, excluding any possibility of a rebirth of German militarism and 'revanchism'. We are concerned, like other peoples of Europe, that Germany should not possess atomic weapons in any form.

"... We believe that every people of Europe, every government having at heart the fate of its people and the cause of peace, should work towards the organization of European security on a new basis: that of the equality of rights of all the European nations. Military blocs should be abolished; non-European troops should leave Europe; military bases should be eliminated; foreign troops should be withdrawn from the soil of foreign countries to within their own national borders. Let us bring about such conditions as will ensure that there shall be no more atomic weapons in Europe."

The Romanian delegation wishes to express its support of the proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world and for measures aimed at averting the danger of the use of atomic weapons, if such measures are accompanied by a commitment by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons and to give the non-nuclear countries guarantees to that effect. It is obvious that the establishment of such zones under those conditions would encourage the countries in question to renounce acquiring nuclear weapons and that it would help to ensure the non-proliferation of such weapons.

The Romanian delegation wishes to dwell today upon certain aspects of European security because it believes that, in a world and age in which international peace and security are proving more and more to be indivisible, the promotion of European security is the problem not only of Europeans but of all mankind. It is

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

one of the problems of peace and constitutes in a certain sense one aspect of the disarmament problem. The efforts that have been made to ensure European security, not by the inappropriate method of indefinitely prolonging the division into hostile military groupings but by the method of establishing and developing normal international relations among all these States, are an integral part of the complex of actions devoted, in the long run, to the creation of conditions favourable to the promotion and achievement of general disarmament and, in the first place, of nuclear disarmament.

Most of the States expressed themselves in that sense when questions of disarmament were discussed during the last session of the General Assembly. It is the direction indicated to us by the resolutions of the General Assembly on the basis of which we are working.

For its part, the Romanian delegation is convinced that the dangerous situation that has now come about in the world must not be allowed to become still worse. We must act decisively in order to put a stop to the arms race and, in the first place, to the nuclear arms race, in order to eliminate completely and for ever the danger of a nuclear war. The whole evolution of post-war events and the whole history of disarmament negotiations show the need to approach the disarmament problem in that way, which alone makes it possible to eliminate the nuclear menace.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): Before I begin my remarks, I should like to refer once more to the specious and contrived way in which members of some of the East European delegations seek to link the problem of Viet-Nam to the issues with which we ought to be dealing and to suggest that it is an obstacle to success in disarmament negotiations. If the communist countries want to use this Committee as a platform from which to launch crude propaganda attacks on the United States, that is their business. If that is what they think the Committee is for, I can only say that my Government thinks that our business lies elsewhere; and I believe that it might be more profitable if some of our colleagues looked upon the tragedy of Viet-Nam not as an excuse for cold-war propaganda, which is not our business, but as one more agonizing reason for reaching agreements as soon as possible on such matters as the control of nuclear weapons, which is our business.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

When I last addressed the Committee, on 16 June, I suggested (ENDC/PV.265, p.12) that perhaps it was time we stopped making ritual speeches at one another and began the serious business of negotiating on measures of disarmament, and especially on the urgent matter of a non-proliferation treaty. Like Mr. Burns, I propose this morning to seek the indulgence of the Committee to allow me to address my remarks, not to the other collateral measures that lie before us, but to the matter of a non-proliferation treaty. I should like to continue what the representative of Canada has begun, which is the process of comparing the two draft non-proliferation treaties that are on the table, and see whether we cannot fashion from them a treaty that will do what we are presumably all trying to do -- that is, to make non-proliferation a matter of international agreement and not simply of national inclination.

I welcome, on behalf of my delegation and Government, the ideas which Mr. Burns has put forward for the comparison of the two treaties and his ideas on the methods by which an agreed draft might be arrived at. However, I should like, if I may, to go into a little more detail about the drafts that lie before us and, as Mr. Burns did, attempt to answer specifically some of the questions that have been asked by the representative of the Soviet Union. Before doing so, I must ask the Soviet Union and its allies to believe of us in the West what we believe of them: that we have no wish to sign a treaty simply to break it for our own purposes. If we sign a non-proliferation treaty we shall be bound by its provisions.

I think that the Soviet Union, in its obsessive concern with the good intentions of the West, and especially in matters like that now called "nuclear sharing", is in fact hurling itself with enormous vigour against an open door. Many of the dangers which it outlines are fantasy; some of the so-called NATO plans to which the Soviet Union and its allies make constant reference have never been NATO plans at all; others have been proposals within the alliance that have been examined; some of them have been discussed, and some of them have been rejected. If the Soviet Union and its allies wish to be assured of the good faith of the West, they must be prepared to negotiate a treaty, and that means that they must not expect all the flexibility, all the concessions and all the amendments to come from the other side.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Recently we have heard in this Committee a great deal about certain alleged "loop-holes" in the United States draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1). Those remarks -- some of them cogently expressed and undoubtedly intended to be helpful but others, I fear, destructively critical in tone -- have been linked with references to the alleged purity of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164). The representative of the Soviet Union and some of his colleagues have returned again and again to the theme that the Western draft is not in accordance with the demands of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161). At the same time they have claimed that the Soviet draft is fully comprehensive and meets every requirement for a non-proliferation treaty. In support of their claim, they have asserted that no one has been able to point to any defects in the Soviet draft and that there is therefore no need for them to consider any possible amendments which might bring the positions of the two sides closer together.

Up to now we have resisted the temptation to point out the weaknesses of the Soviet draft treaty in detail, because it seemed to us more important to settle the broad question of what non-proliferation is about, and then to get down to negotiating a treaty on the basis of that broad agreement and the draft texts which are before us. However, as Mr. Burns has said, we are not making any dramatic progress in agreeing about principles; so perhaps the time has come to examine the Soviet text, to compare it with the Western draft and to see whether it is quite as flawless as our colleagues would have us believe.

When preparing a treaty or a resolution, or any agreement -- even an agreement to buy a motor-car -- a good draftsman will always ask himself two questions before he begins his work. The first is: what do I want to achieve? The second is: how is this to be set out in language that is clear and legally binding? Assuming for the moment that a central decision of purpose has been taken and that we are resolved to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, then the best draft surely is that which sets out that purpose clearly, concisely and comprehensively. I shall return to those three requirements frequently in the course of what I have to say. If that is done, then in the future, even if situations arise which were not envisaged by the original draftsmen, their successors can come back to the text of the treaty and find there, preserved and visible, like a fly in amber, the principles on which the original agreement was based.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

It is possible to approach that objective in one of two ways. We can set out to build a treaty like building a house, using a series of bricks, each one a specific obligation or prohibition, hoping that there is enough material to finish the house and that the finished building will look as it was intended to look, without loop-holes where a brick or two may have been left out by mistake, or even on purpose, and without any extraneous or irrelevant additions. To change the metaphor slightly, this type of draft aims at providing a comprehensive check-list of "do's" and "don'ts" which is instantly available to the most foolish or the most hostile reader as an absolute standard of right and wrong.

There is something to be said for that meticulous method of treaty drafting; but its principal danger is that it demands a most comprehensive and far-sighted -- almost clairvoyant -- skill on the part of the draftsman. Who can say that in two or ten or a hundred years' time some eventuality may not arise which, for all his wisdom, he has not foreseen? Who can be sure that he has not forgotten some vital or trivial possibility through which the whole purpose of his draft may be lost? Indeed, who, in this suspicious world, can be satisfied that he has not slipped in one or two clauses which have nothing to do with the central purpose of the agreement but are designed to further his own separate and perhaps disreputable ends?

The other approach to the drafting of a treaty might be compared to the technique of the map-maker, who first of all draws a line around the outline of the country that is his agreement and then fills in the details: the rivers and hills and roads and valleys and towns. Sometimes he makes a mistake and has to rub out and change the outline of some natural feature; sometimes, where his knowledge or experience is insufficient or perhaps he does not trust his ability to look into the future, he has to leave an area blank and leave it to his successors to argue, measure and decide what should fill the vacant space. However, as long as he has the outline right, then his major purpose is achieved.

Broadly speaking, those are the different approaches which lie behind the two draft treaties now before us and which have been so usefully set out in the Conference document circulated by the Canadian delegation (ENDC/175).

The Soviet draft is a series of bricks, detailed and specific. They do not provide a definition of non-proliferation, but they do purport to add up to a complete prohibition of all forms of proliferation. The Western draft, on the other hand, is

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

an outline picture of what we believe proliferation means. The existing military and political arrangements, the plans for the future and the projects of our allies and of other countries can be tested against this outline and by that test either accepted or found wanting.

Bearing those fundamental differences of approach in mind, let us now look first of all at the Western draft and then at the Soviet draft, to see how they meet the three requirements that I have suggested: that they should be clear, that they should be concise, and that they should be comprehensive.

The United States draft with its subsequent amendments is, I suggest, indisputably clear. Indeed, its very clarity has been objected to by the representative of Bulgaria in his speech at the meeting on 21 June (ENDC/PV.266, p.7) -- although I must confess I have never been able to understand why it should be thought wrong to say what one means. The draft outlines in one sentence what we believe is the core of the debate on non-proliferation. Proliferation takes place if non-nuclear States acquire, either individually or collectively, the right or ability to use nuclear weapons by their own independent choice, that is, without a veto by a nuclear State. As long as an effective veto is retained by the nuclear States, there can never be a nuclear war by the decision of any non-nuclear State or States. If control, as defined in the draft treaty, is transferred, that is to say, if the veto is ineffective, then proliferation takes place, and, as we are all agreed, the danger of nuclear war is immeasurably increased.

All the other arguments, all the debate about whether the non-nuclear States may have "access" to or "association" with nuclear weapons, and about what these terms "access" and "association" mean, are not really about the nature of proliferation at all. They are debates about the effectiveness of the control which is retained by the nuclear States and about the nature of the machinery that is necessary to retain that control. All that is, of course, relevant to the issue of proliferation, but it is not central to the drafting of a treaty.

Perhaps I might take up here for a moment the image used by the representative of Canada -- the metaphor of the motor-car -- and develop it a little. A man may sit in a motor-car or touch it or ride in it; all these may constitute "access" to the vehicle. However, as long as the driver of the vehicle is firmly in control, it would seem to me idle to claim that the passenger or an onlooker can be blamed if

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

there is an accident, unless perhaps someone lies down in the road and allows himself to be run over, or -- and this is perhaps the crucial point -- unless the passenger grabs the wheel and takes over the car with the intention of driving it over a precipice. What measures the driver must take to ensure that that cannot happen must depend on a number of different factors: on the likelihood that the passenger will suddenly go mad, for example; on the relative strengths of the driver and the passenger; and on the objective calculation of what a prudent driver would do in the particular circumstances in which he finds himself.

This business of the control of nuclear weapons is fundamentally a matter of the interaction of rights and of power. If a non-nuclear State achieves the independent right to use nuclear weapons or if, without any such right, it acquires the ability to use them by a mere exercise of its independent will, then proliferation has taken place. This is the outline map of non-proliferation on which the United States draft is based: the clear requirement that the nuclear-weapon States must not transfer, and the non-nuclear-weapon States must not acquire, the control of nuclear weapons. Within that framework we are open to any suggestion concerning the best way to achieve and preserve our objectives.

The representative of the Soviet Union has made the ingenious suggestion that the present United States draft would in certain circumstances allow a third nuclear State to authorize the use of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear State, including even their use against the original owner. I must confess that it is difficult for me to see how that could occur, unless a nuclear State somehow possessed the power to convey to a non-nuclear State the physical ability to use the nuclear weapons of another nuclear State. However, bizarre and unlikely as that situation might be, we are quite prepared to listen to suggestions concerning how it might be avoided.

The point I want to make is that that sort of situation is a practical difficulty within the outline framework of non-proliferation. If it happened, it would constitute a deliberate evasion of the treaty, and, although the consequences of such an evasion would be tragic, they would be the primary responsibility of the nuclear State which directed the use of the weapons, not that of the non-nuclear State.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Of course, it would be a disaster and it would be an act of criminal irresponsibility; but it has nothing to do with proliferation. If a country had made up its mind to behave in such a way and were capable of doing so, no non-proliferation treaty in the world, whether or not drafted by the most painstaking bricklayer, could prevent it.

I believe, therefore, that the purposes of the Western draft treaty are clear. They include the whole of what we mean by non-proliferation, and the central words and phrases of the draft are clearly defined.

Let us look at the next criterion. The draft is certainly concise. By adopting the approach of outlining the principles of non-proliferation rather than trying to enumerate all its component parts, the draftsmen of the treaty have avoided all the "ifs" and "ors" and "ands" and "buts" of the other type of approach. Instead they have succeeded in constructing a set of simple and comprehensive principles which can be used as a measuring-stick of proliferation and non-proliferation for many years to come.

However, the representative of the Soviet Union in his speech at the meeting on 23 June levelled a much more serious charge against the United States draft: that the draft is not comprehensive. In other words, he claims that it leaves open -- he implies, deliberately -- the possibility of escaping from the confines of its own outline map. If I interpret his argument correctly, he is suggesting that the veto is, or could be, a sham. His words in fact were:

"After all, in order to get hold of a nuclear arsenal a State has only to promise that it will not fire nuclear weapons without some one else's permission. Once it has obtained the weapons, a State that has aggressive intentions can easily repudiate its earlier promises" (ENDC/PV.267, p.7).

I must say that I cannot for the life of me see how the Soviet Union can regard a United States veto as something that cannot be relied upon and yet at the same time assume, for example under the formula proposed by Mr. Kosygin -- that is, that all non-aligned non-nuclear countries should be guaranteed against attack by an undertaking of the nuclear Powers (ENDC/167) -- that all non-aligned non-nuclear countries will unquestioningly accept the value of other forms of assurance to be given by the nuclear Powers, including the United States. I must say that I really cannot see the distinction between those two forms of guarantee or undertaking.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

I must repeat that, as was made clear by the United States representative on 28 June (ENDC/PV.268, p.14), this condemnation of Mr. Roshchin's ignores a central requirement of the Western draft, which is that to retain control the nuclear-weapon States must ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States obtain neither the right nor the ability to use nuclear weapons without the consent of the nuclear States. In other words, whatever arrangements are made for preventing a non-nuclear State from obtaining control of nuclear weapons, the nuclear State must ensure at its peril that they are effective. It would be no use wringing one's hands or shrugging one's shoulders afterwards and saying, "I am terribly sorry that they used my nuclear weapons, but they had no right to do so". The responsibility in the Western draft is clearly defined and it cannot be shifted.

That is a real example of the kinds of mutual responsibilities and obligations which are referred to in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). Neither the nuclear State nor the non-nuclear State concerned could escape the responsibility for a breach of the obligations set out in the treaty draft. Whether that is also true of the Soviet draft treaty, I shall examine in a moment.

Indeed, this might be the right moment to turn to the Soviet draft treaty -- which the Soviet delegation has declined to amend or modify, on the ground that it does not need it and that it has never been attacked. Let us apply to it the same tests as those we apply to the Western draft: is it clear; is it concise; is it comprehensive? I might also add this further question: does it confine itself to the matter in hand or does it go outside the field of non-proliferation to deal with extraneous matters which are more properly the study of the defence expert or the historian of the cold war? This last point is one to which we shall inevitably return in the course of our debate; but the Soviet delegation has made such a point of its allegations of "loop-holes" that I think we should try to isolate that problem and, if possible, dispose of it once and for all.

The first thing, which I fear I must say again, as I have said in the past, is that the Soviet draft is, regrettably, far from being clear. Our best lawyers have studied the Soviet text and the comments of the Soviet Union and its allies on it, and we simply do not know in many important aspects what it means. We do not, for example, know whether the word "control", as it is used in the first sentence of

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

article I, paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft treaty, is the same thing as the word "control" which appears in the second sentence of the same draft. Different words are used in each sentence in the original Russian version. In the first instance the Russian word used is "rasporyazhenie"; in the second it is "kontrol". Is the difference significant or is it not? Even if the intention is the same, what is the meaning? There is no definition of control as there is in the Western draft, and we are left entirely in the dark about it.

Again, if we refer to article II(1), what does the prohibition on the participation of the non-nuclear States in the use of nuclear weapons mean? Does it refer to testing of nuclear weapons? Does it mean that the non-nuclear States could not join with the nuclear States in testing nuclear weapons? Or does it mean that in the circumstances of a nuclear war -- which we hope are entirely remote -- the allies of the nuclear States would have to be content to be the passive recipients of whatever missiles might fall upon them? Would any treaty which demanded such an ultimate undertaking make any sense? Does the Soviet Union really believe that, if we come to the ultimate and desperate folly of a war between nuclear Powers, the provisions of a non-proliferation treaty will be of much more than academic relevance? That is what a non-proliferation treaty is designed very largely to prevent.

Again, we might ask: what does "preparation for manufacture" mean in article II(1)? I do not need to labour this point, as it was very ably expounded by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her speech on 24 February (ENDC/PV.243, pp.11,12). But, if the Soviet Union claims perfection for its draft, can it please identify the point at which preparation for the manufacture of nuclear weapons begins and peaceful nuclear activity ends?

There is another question: what is a "State possessing nuclear weapons"? It is not defined anywhere in the Soviet treaty. Possession is simply a term of art. It may mean something approaching legal ownership or it may mean no more than mere custody. If it means the latter, that is, custody, then a non-nuclear State could at this moment gain nuclear status merely by borrowing or acquiring a nuclear weapon, if necessary under the strictest possible safeguards, from its nuclear ally. By such means it could gain exemption for the indefinite future from the prohibition in the draft treaty on the manufacture of its own nuclear arsenal -- a possibility which I should like to examine in more detail in a moment. Is that really what the Soviet Union has in mind?

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Finally, perhaps I should draw attention to Mr. Burns' statement of 4 April in which he said about the question of safeguards:

"... the Soviet text does not at present contain any provision on that subject. In our view this is a serious omission and one which will have to be rectified if the treaty is to have its full impact in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons". (ENDC/PV.254, p.12).

The question of safeguards, to which Mr. Burns has again referred today, can make a vital contribution to non-proliferation; and the Committee will recall that only the other day my delegation was able to announce (ENDC/PV.266, p.10) that the Bradwell reactor in the United Kingdom had been put under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Can we expect some parallel gesture from the Soviet Union and some acknowledgement from it of that omission in its draft text?

Those are a few examples of obscurities, uncertainties and loop-holes in the Soviet draft which, I must repeat, our closest scrutiny and our most thorough enquiries have failed to resolve. So I submit that, on the grounds of clarity alone, the draft leaves much to be desired.

If it is not entirely clear, is the Soviet treaty a concise statement of the meaning of non-proliferation? I do not believe that it is; and, to be fair, we must admit, I think, that it is not even intended to be. That method of drafting treaties which relies upon thinking up all the possible eventualities and setting them down in all their complexities and variations does not lend itself to brevity. But here lies another danger, which really brings me to the third requirement of comprehensiveness. In the welter of conditional clauses, undefined words such as "ownership", "control" and "use", and unexplained verbs like "transfer", "participate", "provide" or "prepare", it is not easy to be sure that some vital verbal bricks have not been left out.

I shall take but one example, the one I mentioned a moment ago: the definition of a "State possessing nuclear weapons". This phrase in the Soviet draft treaty is not tied to any base date. That is to say, there is no day on which one can say with certainty, "These are the nuclear States; those are the non-nuclear States." It follows that the wisest thing which a non-nuclear State could do, if it thinks that it might some day want to build nuclear weapons, would be to delay its ratification of the treaty, meanwhile hurriedly completing its preparations for a first nuclear test; after that it could emerge triumphantly to ratify the treaty as a fully-fledged nuclear State. Is that what the Soviet Union intends by its treaty?

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Furthermore, as I said a moment ago, if a "State possessing nuclear weapons" means no more than a State having the custody of nuclear weapons, then a non-nuclear State which has already signed and ratified the treaty might, in certain circumstances, be able to change its status to that of a nuclear State.

The Soviet draft treaty would prohibit such a State from obtaining the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. But, as I have already said, we do not know what those terms really mean. Perhaps I might now elaborate the hypothesis to which I referred very briefly a moment ago. Let us suppose, as I have suggested, that a non-nuclear State were to borrow or acquire a nuclear weapon, possibly from a nuclear State not party to the treaty -- under strict controls, of course, and without the power to use it or move it and without any independent control over it whatsoever. It could merely hold it. The weapon need never be armed, since in the Soviet draft treaty the meaning of a "nuclear weapon" is not defined either. It would not have ownership or control or the power of use or even control over emplacement, since it could not move the weapon; there would therefore be no contravention of the terms of the treaty. But it might have custody, and therefore possession, which are not forbidden to the non-nuclear States by the treaty text. The paradoxical situation would then arise that by thus acquiring possession it would become a nuclear State, with all the power to manufacture nuclear weapons to its heart's content. Is that what the Soviet Union really means?

The representative of the Soviet Union may dismiss some of these examples as far-fetched, hypothetical and fantastic; but they are no more so than some of the contingencies he has suggested might arise under the provisions of the Western draft. I have cited them, not to condemn the Soviet draft out of hand, but to illustrate the fact that no treaty draft is perfect, that all agreements have to be reached by hard bargaining and careful scrutiny of the meaning of every word; and also to point the moral that the bricklayer's treaty is not necessarily superior to the map-maker's merely because it is more detailed.

In conclusion, I should, however, like to point to one aspect of the comparison between the Soviet and United States draft treaties where I think the representative of the Soviet Union has been seriously misled by his own argument. I have already

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touched upon the fact that on 23 June (ENDC/PV.267, pp.7,8) he made great play with what he called the inadequacy of the concept of the veto, which is an integral part of the United States draft. I have suggested that that attack was misconceived. But let us see how his own arguments look when we apply them to the Soviet draft treaty. The situation which he predicates depends on the assumption that the non-nuclear State concerned has already decided to ignore its own obligations under the treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons, and this would be so whichever draft has been finally adopted. Our attention must therefore be focussed on the question whether the nuclear State which originally held the nuclear weapon has fulfilled its treaty commitments.

Let us suppose that after the signature of the Soviet draft treaty a nuclear State wished to help a non-nuclear State to obtain nuclear weapons. It could, without contravening the strict terms of the treaty, simply put the weapons in a building on the territory of the non-nuclear State and say to it and to the world, using the words of the Soviet draft treaty, "These weapons are mine. I have not transferred them into your ownership or control; I have left a guardian with them to look after them; I have not accorded to you the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of them. But of course if, in defiance of this statement, you decide to seize the weapons, then that is no concern of mine. I shall not have transferred control to you; you will have taken it by force. I shall not have granted you the right; you will have appropriated it on your own." The example I have just given is in fact virtually identical with that with which the representative of the Soviet Union has attempted to discredit the Western draft treaty. The only difference that I can see is that the Soviet draft is open to that objection whereas the United States draft is not.

As I have already said, in the United States draft the responsibility lies equally between the nuclear and the non-nuclear States for any breach of the treaty resulting from the transfer of nuclear weapons, whether the transfer be voluntary or nominally involuntary. The nuclear State must ensure, at its peril, that its arrangements to retain its control are adequate and effective. If the Soviet draft were signed, the nuclear State could shrug its shoulders or perhaps, if it wanted to create a good effect, even wring its hands and say that it was not its fault. Is that really how we are to interpret resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, which demands a balance of obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear States?

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

I am not trying to suggest that the Soviet Union has deliberately left this glaring loop-hole in its treaty in order to be able to arm any of its friends with nuclear weapons. Apart from other considerations, I believe that it learned the folly of that many months ago in China. If we are to get away, as the representative of Canada has suggested, from the sterility of accusation and counter-accusation, we must begin from a position in which we give each other credit for good intentions. If there are faults in the proposals of others, we should conclude that they arise from failures of imagination or failures of communication and not from any Machiavellian ill-will. If there are faults in our own proposals, we should not be too proud to accept correction and advice -- and we shall not be.

I should like, then, to hope that we can now move on from this sterile exercise of scoring points against each other's positions as if we were competitors in a World Cup football competition. If I have been critical today of the Soviet draft treaty, is has not been with any destructive or polemical motive. I wish to adopt no posture of moral asymmetry in which one side is always right and the other side always wrong. In the battle to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, there should be no question of who shall make "sacrifices" and who shall not. If the nuclear Powers go on trying to extract concessions from each other, and if the non-nuclear Powers use these negotiations as a means of demanding more and more concessions from the nuclear Powers, we shall sink into a bog of useless word-mongering. The only sacrifice asked of anyone here is the renunciation of the right of collective suicide -- a privilege of dubious value. Let us agree, if we can, on what we really mean by "proliferation" and then get down to agree upon a treaty. We do not have much time.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened to the statements of the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, Romania and the United Kingdom. Many arguments expressed in those statements deserve serious attention and thorough examination. The Soviet delegation will study the statements and in due course state its position in regard to the arguments put forward therein.

In connexion with the allegation of the United Kingdom representative that the delegations of the socialist States are using the Committee as a propaganda platform, we should like to emphasize that this is manifestly contrary to the real state of affairs in the Committee. The delegations of the USSR and other socialist

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

countries have been and are putting forward specific proposals and discussing these questions in their most specific aspects. At the same time, in discussing the problem of disarmament, which is closely linked with the world situation and changes in the international atmosphere, we cannot fail to touch upon those matters in so far as they affect the work of the Committee and influence the prospects of solving the problems under consideration by the Committee. It is therefore perfectly natural that the delegations of the socialist, the Western and the non-aligned States should touch in their statements upon the most important problems of the international situation in the context of which the work of the Committee is being carried on.

In his intervention at the 269th meeting of our Committee the United States representative, Mr. Foster, quoted a number of statements by United States political leaders attempting to justify United States aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the peace-loving Viet-Nameese people. The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to inform the members of the Committee of a statement by the Soviet Government dated 1 July this year in connexion with the barbaric bombings by the United States Air Force of the suburbs of Hanoi and the main port of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Haiphong. The text of the Soviet Government's statement is as follows:

"Aircraft of the United States Air Force have carried out raids on the suburbs of the capital of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Hanoi, and the main port of the country, Haiphong, and have bombed a number of targets there.

"The bombing by the United States Air Force of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas is particularly dangerous. It shows that the United States Government has embarked on a course designed to expand further the shameful war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the whole Viet-Nameese people.

"There are reports that Washington is hatching barbarous plans to destroy dams and barrages in North Viet-Nam, which may imperil the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and deprive them of their means of livelihood and homes.

"These crimes, committed on direct orders of the United States Government, have caused profound indignation throughout the world. The Soviet people and the peace-loving peoples of the whole world denounce and condemn the aggressive circles of the United States for their evil deeds against the Viet-Nameese people.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The United States is coarsely trampling underfoot the Geneva Agreement on Indo-China and international law, placing force and force alone above the most elementary moral and legal standards adopted in relations between people and States. The latest bandit actions of the United States soldiery in Viet-Nam show once again to the whole world that the talk of the United States Government about its seeking for a 'peaceful settlement' in Viet-Nam is only hollow words.

"The Viet-Nameese people have not flinched in the face of the bandit attacks by the United States. The intervention in South Viet-Nam by hundreds of thousands of United States soldiers equipped with the most modern weapons of every type, and the raids on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, have been opposed by the unshakeable will of the Viet-Nameese people to defend the freedom and independence of their native land and by their determination to defeat the foreign invaders.

"The criminal policy of the United States ruling circles in Viet-Nam is being paid for by the American people with the lives of thousands of young Americans. Continuation and expansion of the war of aggression against Viet-Nam will only cause the American people further altogether unjustified human sacrifices. Moved by political ambitions and urged on by the military-industrial monopolies, the circles that determine the foreign policy of the United States are alluring the country into the path of further adventures imperilling world peace and bringing the United States only dishonour and shame.

"No escalation of the war will bring the Viet-Nameese people to their knees or force them to give up their inalienable right to decide their own future. The solution of the Viet-Nameese problem can be found only on the basis of the programmes proposed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam. The road to peace in Viet-Nam lies through the ending of foreign aggression and of intervention in the internal affairs of the Viet-Nameese people. The United States armed forces must be withdrawn from Viet-Nam.

"The heroic struggle of the Viet-Nameese people against the aggressors is meeting with wide support from the progressive forces in the world. The Soviet Union has given and will give the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam all possible assistance -- political, economic and in means of defence -- in its

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

struggle against imperialist aggression. The Soviet people have supported and will continue to support the liberation struggle of the people of South Viet-Nam for national independence, democracy, peace and unification of the country. This support will be given to the extent necessary to help the Viet-Nameese people to defend its just cause.

"The criminal raids on the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, testifying to a further expansion of the bandit war of the United States against the Viet-Nameese people, still further aggravate the situation in the Viet-Nam region and the whole international atmosphere. No State, however far away from Viet-Nam, no government demonstrating not simulated but genuine concern for the future of peace, can be indifferent to this.

"The Soviet Government expresses its confidence that the peoples and governments of the countries which do not want a dangerous aggravation of the international situation and an expansion of the war of aggression started by the United States will speak decisively in favour of the ending of the United States war against Viet-Nam, and in defence of the just cause of the Viet-Nameese people".

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): It had been my hope that we could this morning devote our already shrinking time here to a constructive approach to solving the great problems in connexion with nuclear arms. Two speakers today have used our time in that fashion: the representatives of Canada and the United Kingdom. The United States had also prepared some remarks directed towards that end; but, in the circumstances brought about by the comments by the representatives of Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR, instead it becomes necessary for me again to reply to their charges.

Once again this Committee has been subjected, as a captive audience, to an unwarranted and distorted attack on my country's actions in Viet-Nam. The mere fact that the Soviet representative or his Government states certain things to be so does not make them so. The fact that the tragedy of Viet-Nam is communist-inspired is pointedly overlooked by the communist delegations at this table.

I find it hard to believe that any country seriously interested in advancing the work of this Committee would try so often to divert its attention to extraneous matters. As the representative of Poland pointed out at our last meeting, "we are not called upon to discuss the Viet-Nam situation here" (ENDC/PV.269, p.38). It is unfortunate that he and several other representatives have done so.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I take the floor now only to make clear precisely what the United States aims are in bombing petroleum facilities in North Viet-Nam. The petroleum dumps near Hanoi and Haiphong are targets of obvious military significance. Without adequate stocks of gasoline, the ability of the Hanoi régime to infiltrate men, weapons and other matériel into South Viet-Nam would be greatly reduced.

The recent bombings do not signal a major change in United States policy; they result from a sharp increase in the rate of infiltration and a much heavier reliance on motor transport to support that infiltration. Our response is designed to increase the cost of the escalation in aggression against the South. We have attacked only targets which are of direct military significance, and we shall continue to attack such targets which are relevant to the ability of Hanoi to continue its aggression in the South.

Moreover, as Mr. Goldberg stated in his recent letter to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations:

"In the recent attacks on petroleum facilities, every effort has been made to prevent harm to civilians and to avoid destruction of non-military facilities. The petroleum facilities attacked were located away from the population centres of both Hanoi and Haiphong. The pilots were carefully instructed to take every precaution so that only military targets would be hit. Moreover, to assure accuracy, the attacks have been scheduled only under weather conditions permitting clear visual sighting. Unfortunately, no such discrimination ... is to be found in the behaviour of the communists in Viet-Nam, a fact clearly demonstrated by their record of terrorism and the assassination of innocent civilians."

The troops of the United States Government and those of the other nations contributing to the defence of South Viet-Nam are present at the invitation of the South Viet-Nameese Government. There are no allied troops north of the 17th parallel. We are engaged, however, in combating regular army units of the Hanoi régime fighting to the south of the 17th parallel. They are not there at the invitation of the South Viet-Nameese Government.

The position of the United States Government with respect to peace negotiations on Viet-Nam is clear to all. My Government has been ready, and continues to be ready, to negotiate at any time with a view to stopping the military conflict in Viet-Nam. I have previously alluded to the thirty-seven-day bombing pause during which time the United States Government engaged in the most intense diplomatic

(Mr. Foster, United States)

activity designed to bring about a peacefully-negotiated settlement in Viet-Nam. We have recently made new efforts to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table, but it refuses to come. Instead it issues rigid statements of an extreme position which would require the virtual surrender of South Viet-Nam.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): The representative of the United States has quoted one sentence from a statement which I made during our last meeting to the effect that we are not called upon to discuss the Viet-Nam situation (ENDC/PV.269, p.38). I still maintain that that is so, and I do not believe that it is the intention of anyone here to open a full-dress debate on the United States policies in Viet-Nam. I can assure him that if that were our intention we should not have confined ourselves to such short speeches.

I should like to say, however, that we are in duty bound to draw the attention of this Committee and the attention of the world public to the effects of the events in South-East Asia on our deliberations. Whatever our resolve to bring our negotiations to a successful conclusion, we all realize, I suppose, that, as long as the aggressive policy of the United States in South-East Asia continues, our chances do not look very bright.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 270th meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E Ambassador Hussein Khallaf, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, Romania, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the United States and Poland.

"The following document was submitted by the Canadian delegation:

"' Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Tabular Comparison of the USA Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/152 and ENDC/152/Add.1) and the USSR Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/164)' ¹/₁

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 7 July 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

